PIPE Dreams? The Performance of Companies Issuing Equity Privately

Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) have become an important source of financing for young, publicly traded firms whose poor operating performance may limit alternative financing options. We propose that firms are motivated to sell these securities to minimize costs associated with asymmetric information. We find that both the security structure and the investor composition of a PIPE security matter in the subsequent performance of the issuing firm. Poor post-issuance performance is associated with securities where investors obtain significant repricing rights, which protect them from future stock price declines. Furthermore, companies that obtain financing from hedge funds tend to under-perform companies that obtain financing from other institutional investors. We argue that hedge funds act as investors of last resort, playing an important role in the market for young, high-risk firms with substantial asymmetric information. Hedge funds are willing to fund such high-risk companies because they can protect against possible price declines in the issuing companies by either negotiating PIPE securities with repricing rights or by entering into short positions of the underlying stocks of the issuing companies.

Enhancing the Benefits for India and Other Developing Countries in the Doha Development Agenda Negotiations

When firms from developed markets acquire firms in emerging markets, marketcapitalization-weighted monthly joint returns show a statistically significant increase of 1.8%. Panel data estimations suggest that the value gains from cross-border M&A transactions stem from the transfer of majority control from emerging-market targets to developed market acquirers—joint returns range from 5.8% to 7.8% when majority control is acquired. Announcement returns for acquirer and target firms estimate the distribution of gains and show a statistically significant increase of 2.4% and 6.9%, respectively. The evidence suggests that the stock market anticipates significant value creation from cross-border transactions that involve emerging-market targets leading to substantial gains for shareholders of both acquirer and target firms.

Within-Firm Pay Inequality

Financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms, this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality—relative wage differentials between top- and bottom-level jobs—are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Moreover, firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises, suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market. Our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent

A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics LIS Working Paper Series Wage Inequality and Firm Growth Wage Inequality and Firm Growth *

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in February 2015 Abstract We examine how within-firm skill premia-wage differentials associated with jobs involving different skill requirements-vary both across firms and over time. Our firm-level results mirror patterns found in aggregate wage trends, except that we find them with regard to increases in firm size. In particular, we find that wage differentials between high-and either medium-or low-skill jobs increase with firm size, while those between medium-and low-skill jobs are either invariant to firm size or, if anything, slightly decreasing. We find the same pattern within firms over time, suggesting that rising wage inequality-even nuanced patterns, such as divergent trends in upper-and lower-tail inequality-may be related to firm growth. We explore two possible channels: i) wages associated with "routine" job tasks are relatively lower in larger firms due to a higher degree of automation in these firms, and ii) larger firms pay relatively lower entry-level managerial wages in return for providing better career opportunities. Lastly, we document a strong and positive relation between within-country variation in firm growth and rising wage inequality for a broad set of developed countries. In fact, our results suggest that part of what may be perceived as a global trend toward more wage inequality may be driven by an increase in employment by the largest firms in the economy. * We thank Xavier Giroud, Claudia Goldin, and Johannes Stroebel for valuable comments and Raymond Story at Income Data Services (IDS) for help with the data. † NYU Stern School of Business, NBER, CEPR, and ECGI

Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort?

Hedge funds have become important investors in public companies raising equity privately. Hedge funds tend to finance companies that have poor fundamentals and pronounced information asymmetries. To compensate for these shortcomings, hedge funds protect themselves by requiring substantial discounts, negotiating repricing rights, and entering into short positions of the underlying stocks. We find that companies that obtain financing from hedge funds significantly underperform companies that obtain financing from other investors during the following two years. We argue that hedge funds are investors of last resort and provide funding for companies that are otherwise constrained from raising equity capital. The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

The Value of Control in Emerging Markets

When a developed-country multinational firm acquires majority control of a firm in an emerging market, there is an economically large and statistically significant increase in the acquiring firm's stock price. In 1986--2006, developed-market acquirers experienced positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.16%, on average, over a three-day event window. Positive acquirer returns and dollar value gains appear unique to emerging-market mergers and acquisitions and are not replicated when the same developed-market acquirers take over firms in developed markets. The size of the stock price increase is more pronounced (a) the weaker the contracting environment in the emerging market and (b) for industries with high asset intangibility. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.